February 10, 2014
Relying on personal accounts, letters, diaries, and interviews, Perry (Grant and Twain) provocatively reinterprets the volatile relationship between F.D.R. and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Calls for “a man on a prancing steed” were widespread during the tumultuous Depression; the obvious candidate was then army chief of staff MacArthur. Angling to claim the White House, F.D.R. desired to “tame” this man of considerable abilities and make him “useful to us.” For 15 years he succeeded, making optimal use of “the most dangerous man in America” by channeling MacArthur’s ego and talents instead of opposing him outright. MacArthur’s 1941 assignment as commander of U.S. forces in the Far East was a lost cause from the beginning—and both Roosevelt and MacArthur knew it. But returning to the Philippines became MacArthur’s obsession, and despite his prickly persona Roosevelt kept him in command for “sound military reasons.” MacArthur established the institutional and doctrinal framework for one of WWII’s most successful economy-of-force campaigns, developed America’s most successful senior combined-arms command and logistics team, and convinced Roosevelt that America’s debt to the Philippines could be paid only by their liberation in arms. It is a distinguished list of achievements and Perry demonstrates the debt MacArthur owed to Roosevelt’s insight as well as his thick skin.
March 15, 2014
Douglas MacArthur loomed over the America of World War II and the Korean War. Despite much existing scholarship (e.g., D. Clayton James's The Years of MacArthur and Geoffrey Perret's Old Soldiers NeverDie), there is room for foreign affairs analyst Perry's (Partners in Command) focused study of MacArthur's career from the early 1930s through World War II. Perry explores in particular the complicated relationship between President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and the man he considered a potential presidential opponent. Perry provides illuminating sketches of many of the war's major players, both in Washington, DC, and in the Pacific Theater, including Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, MacArthur's superior in Washington; and Admiral Chester Nimitz, who led the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. Perry recounts MacArthur's loss and gain of the Philippines, as well as many of the other battles that he waged in the South Pacific during 1942 to 1945 as commander in chief of the army in the Pacific. The book ends with the conclusion of the war with Japan in September 1945. VERDICT While much has been written on the general topic, Perry is strong on discussing MacArthur's relationship with FDR as well as his fellow officers in the Pacific. A gripping read, this book will be valuable to the novice and specialist alike and is recommended for all collections.--Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ. Lib., Ames
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Starred review from February 1, 2014
In a study of quiet authority, Perry spotlights the presumptuous commanding general at the moment of his evolving maturity during the Pacific theater and apotheosis in the Philippines. Working by comparison and contrast as he has done in previous works on George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower (Partners in Command, 2007) and Ulysses Grant and Mark Twain (Grant and Twain, 2004), Perry draws Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) in sharp relief against the actions and policies of Franklin Roosevelt, who recognized his rival's power and perversity and privately called him the most dangerous man in America. Roosevelt admired the war hero and Army chief of staff, inherited from Hoover's administration, and mistrusted his motives and ambition, but Roosevelt resisted dismissing him, as recommended by his New Dealers. Instead, he shrewdly employed him as a foil to his Republican opponents. While Perry is not blind to MacArthur's overriding character issues--including arrogance, vanity and paranoia--the author does suggest that the general has been judged overwhelmingly by his strong-arm tactics, his leadership obtuseness after the Pearl Harbor attack and his later confrontation with President Harry S. Truman--and also underappreciated for some of his actions during his wartime command in the Pacific, namely the coordinated land, sea and air assault of Operation Cartwheel. "Exiled" to the Philippines yet providentially situated in 1940 when chaos was unleashed in the Pacific, MacArthur nonetheless underestimated the Japanese threat and overestimated the Philippines' troops. His "dilatory" response on the morning of Dec. 8, 1941, led to the Clark Field debacle and the "dooming" of the Philippines. Perry impressively moves through each of the seminal arenas of the Pacific war. A majestic overview with an engaging sense of the nuance of character. Thankfully, Perry doesn't become mired in familiar biographical detail.
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March 15, 2014
Fifty years after his death, Douglas MacArthur remains one of the most controversial figures in American history. His admirers continue to cite his battlefield courage, his military acumen and daring, and his wisdom in administering the occupation of Japan. His detractors cite his egotism, his contempt for his civilian and military superiors, and his recklessness. All of these characteristics and more are on display in this excellent but limited examination of MacArthur's life in the critical years preceding and including WWII. Perry, who in previous works has described the partnership between historical figures, views the odd but successful relationship between MacArthur and President Roosevelt. Roosevelt didn't like or trust MacArthur, and he was acutely aware that MacArthur's brutal dispersal of the Bonus Marchers was a political disaster for his predecessor, Hoover. Yet, he and his advisors effectively tamed MacArthur and harnessed his military talents. Conversely, MacArthur distrusted Roosevelt's politics and favoritism toward the U.S. Navy, but he learned to restrain his go-it-alone instincts and won Roosevelt's respect, if not affection. This is an informative and easily digestible rendering of their uneasy but effective cooperation in winning the war in the Pacific.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2014, American Library Association.)